欧州海上安全レポート
In the wake of new cable incidents in Baltic Sea several countries toughen their approach towards the Russian shadow fleet
In recent weeks, two more suspicious damages of subsea cables were reported in the Baltic Sea Basin. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, such incidents have been multiplying as Russia uses the destruction of electricity and communications cables as well as pipelines as part of its hybrid warfare against NATO and the EU.
One incident at the end of December was reported among others by news outlet Politico[1]. It involves the Fitburg, a cargo ship sailing under the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The suspected vessel departed from St. Petersburg and was on the way to Israel with crew members from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Russia. The ship is suspected of having caused cable damage on 31 December in Estonia’s exclusive economic zone by deliberately dragging its anchor. A few hours later, the Finnish coast guard caught the vessel in Finnish waters and the crew was arrested, according to German media Tagesschau[2]. The crew is suspected of aggravated disruption of telecommunications and also aggravated sabotage and attempted aggravated sabotage. In early January, a sub-sea communications cable was reportedly damaged off the Latvian coast, according to news reports[3]. The vessel, which is suspected of having caused the damage, is mooring at the Latvian port of Liepaja and the authorities explained the crew seemed prepared to cooperate so that there was no need to detain the vessel.
In the meantime, the European Commission has published a reply[4] to a written question[5] on the topic of cable damages submitted by a Member of the European Parliament from the centrist Renew group. The question relates to the suggestion to create a European reserve fleet for repairing subsea power cables, an idea that had been floated by the European Commission in its Action Plan[6] on cable security from last February. While the European Commission outlines a few ideas on how to improve cable security, it is evasive on the topic of a dedicated repair fleet.
Related to the cable incidents reported above, several EU and NATO member states are reported to step up their response to the Russian shadow fleet, which is suspected of often being involved in these incidents. According to a news report[7] by Politico, the UK is “ready to work with its European allies to intercept vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet.” On a visit to Finland, British minister of foreign affairs Yvette Cooper said Britain was prepared to work with its allies on enforcement against ships suspected of carrying sanctioned oil or damaging undersea infrastructure. While she remained vague as to what actions would be taken exactly, experts think the more robust approach could involve boarding shadow fleet vessels and seizing their cargo. The minister also praised the work by Finland, a country with first-hand experience and exposure to the shadow fleet.
In the meantime, German authorities have reportedly also toughened their stance against the Russian shadow fleet. According to national media[8] the Federal Police has recently refused the passage of several shadow fleet vessels through German coastal waters.
The stricter approach against shadow fleet vessels is also a consequence of a change of interpretation of international law. While UNCLOS in principle grants all vessels innocent passage, this does not apply if the vessels have no or a false flag or if the purpose of their passage is obviously not peaceful.
[1] https://www.politico.eu/article/7709793/
[2] https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/europa/ostsee-unterseekabel-ermittlung-100.html
[3] https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/latvia-pm-says-baltic-sea-optical-cable-has-been-damaged-2026-01-04/
[4] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-004479-ASW_EN.html
[5] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-004479_EN.html
[6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52025JC0009
[7] https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-work-europe-vladimir-putin-shadow-fleet-forces-vessels/
[8] https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/schattenflotte-vorgehen-100.html
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