欧州海上安全レポート
GPS jamming and spoofing remains high on the agenda at EU level
The disruption of Global Navigation Satellite System signals (GNSS interference), a phenomenon that has been frequently observed in the EU over past months, is being discussed and addressed at several levels. Given that vessels can be affected, the topic has an important maritime safety and security component.
EU Telecommunications Ministers discussed the issue at a Council meeting[1] in December. The agenda item was proposed by Lithuania, a country particularly affected by the phenomenon, and supported by other member states. The Lithuanian delegation stressed that the situation has worsened over the last months and that there are new interference sources affecting the country. The most affected sector is aviation but other sectors including shipping are also hit. The Lithuanians estimate that disruptions are not accidental and that they originate from Russian territories. The authorities consider the interference an intentional act that violates international law. They consider it unacceptable behaviour that requires joint action and that no member state can address this threat alone. The intervention ended with a call to protect aviation, navigation, and other critical infrastructures. The statements made by other delegations reflected general consensus that the threat of GNSS interference is growing rapidly and that joint coordinated action at EU level is the only way to address the issue. At the end, a Commission representative echoed the concerns made by ministers. Importantly, the representative noted that an EU wide action plan will be put forward some time next year.
The topic is also receiving increased attention in the European Parliament, as evidenced by a recent question[2] by MEP Sérgio Gonçalves, a Portuguese MEP from the centre-left S&D group. In his question, the MEP highlights that threats posed by GPS interference are also present outside the Baltic, specifically referring to the Atlantic. In his answer[3] Transport Commissioner Tzitzikostas provides more information on the EMSA AIS spoofing group and its latest updates.
At operational level, Frontex reports[4] that it has developed a small-scale application to alert patrol vessels when navigation signals are jammed or spoofed and help crews maintain awareness of their position. The project involves the EU Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), the Romanian Coast Guard, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) and industrial partners.
[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/tte/2025/12/05/
[2] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003811_EN.html
[3] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2025-003811-ASW_EN.html
[4] https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/frontex-pilots-galileo-based-tracking-solution-to-detect-navigation-signal-interference-Hxud64
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