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 ◆ Introduction

  This report outlines participation in “Oceanology International 2026 (OI 2026)[1] ,” held at Excel London[2] in London, UK, from March 10 to 12, 2026. Organised by RX[3], the European Commission[4] describes this exhibition as a leading international forum for marine science, technology, and engineering.

  The three-day exhibition brought together 461 companies from over 30 countries, attracting 15,709 visitors in total. At the venue, numerous products related to marine science, technology, and engineering were on display, and demonstrations of full-scale exhibits, such as ships and USV, were conducted at the adjacent dockside. Additionally, conference zones such as the Coast Theatre were established, where a total of 203 speakers participated in seminars and panel discussions.

 During this visit, the author observed a significant number of exhibits featuring Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USV). USV, which are surface vessels operating without a crew on board, are attracting growing attention worldwide.[5] Japan is no exception, with recognised challenges including insufficient testing and development infrastructure (demonstration facilities and field sites) and the absence of adequate regulatory frameworks for unmanned marine vehicles.[6]

  This report presents case studies from Europe and the UK, compiled from booth visits and seminars at the venue. The content reflects the author’s own observations and is not intended as an endorsement of any specific company.

◆Notable USV Exhibitors

 (1) ACUA Ocean[7]

  A startup based in Plymouth, UK. As a USV equipped with a hydrogen fuel cell, it was the first in the industry to obtain certification under Annex 2 of The Workboat Code Edition 3[8], the safety implementation standards for small workboats and pilot boats, as authorised by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)[9].[10] In addition, its flagship USV, the “Pioneer,” runs on hydrogen fuel and achieves 24-hour, zero-emission operation.[11]

 (2) Ocean Infinity[12]

  Based in Southampton, UK, Ocean Infinity is an industry-leading marine technology company. It seeks to replace the complex operations of large, manned vessels with unmanned alternatives. Rather than relying solely on fully autonomous navigation, the company prioritizes remote operation, in which human operators monitor and control missions from a land-based Remote Operation Centre (ROC).

 (3) XOCEAN[13]

  An Ireland-based company, XOCEAN operates USV equipped with hybrid power sources (solar panels, batteries, and small generators). Notably, it leverages high-speed internet services such as Starlink[14] and the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) to remotely control its USV worldwide, including in Japan, from a Remote Operation Centre on land.

 (4) Maritime Robotics[15]

  Headquartered in Norway, Maritime Robotics offers vessels tailored to various applications, ranging from eco-friendly small boats to USV capable of long-term operation. Having established a sales track record with Japanese firms, its products support surveys of shallow waters and harbour topography. Beyond vessel sales, the company also provides the onboard systems that serve as the navigational “brain,” enabling a higher degree of automation.

◆ Institutional Challenges to USV Adoption

  At a panel session held at the venue, titled “EXPLORING THE FUTURE POTENTIAL OF IN-WATER TEST FACILITIES FOR DUAL-USE “[16], industry operators and regulatory authorities engaged in a candid exchange of views on the practical institutional challenges surrounding the ‘barriers to testing and certification’ hindering USV adoption. In the UK, the MCA navigates innovative technologies through the interpretation and application of existing laws and regulations. Where these do not provide sufficient coverage, guidance such as MGN 664 is applied, and exemptions from existing regulations may be granted where necessary. To obtain such certifications or exemptions, applicants must demonstrate the basis for their risk assessments and safety cases and secure MCA approval.

 (1) Legal Framework: The Paradox of the “Vicious Cycle” of Testing and Certification

 ACUA Ocean, speaking as an industry representative, highlighted that the current safety certification process imposes a “brutal” burden on startups in terms of both cost and effort. In response, Sam Hodder of the MCA, the regulatory authority, acknowledged that a structural contradiction exists: “in order to have the data available to demonstrate your safety case, you need to have a vessel that you could take out, like a test on, and you can’t take out and trial your vessel because you can’t get it coded because it’s not been able to demonstrate a safety case.” The session further underscored that relying solely on physical testing at sea proves insufficient and risky for demonstrating compliance with the Collision Regulations (COLREGs)[17] in congested waters. Consequently, there is a growing recognition that safety evidence must be provided using “digital twins (simulations)”[18], which accurately replicate vessel hulls and real-world physical phenomena in a virtual space.

 (2) Documentation: An Obstacle to Flexible and Rapid Technology Development

  ACUA Ocean further emphasised the challenges startups face in independently preparing the complex documentation demanded by regulatory authorities on safety standards and risk assessments. The requirement for re-certification even upon minor changes to a vessel’s specifications was also criticised as a factor that stifles the flexible and rapid approach to technological development, one of “failing fast and improving fast”.

◆ UK Initiatives Addressing the Above Challenges

   (National Centre for Marine Autonomy / NCMA)

  To address these two challenges, the UK launched national-level initiatives centred on the Plymouth region. There, the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)[19] has designated the National Centre for Marine Autonomy (NCMA)[20], fostering collaboration among industry, academia, and government as outlined below.

(1) Addressing Regulatory Inconsistencies: A Phased Testing Framework and Dedicated Test Environments

  To break the “vicious cycle” of testing and certification, Plymouth Marine Laboratory (PML)[21] and the University of Plymouth[22], key NCMA partners, are collaborating with the MCA to develop the Maritime Regulatory Innovation Framework (MRIF)[23]. Rather than mandating full safety certification from the outset, this framework permits phased sea trials by establishing operational risk mitigation measures (initial safety cases), such as the deployment of standby vessels and emergency shutdown procedures. This allows prototype vessels to undergo specification changes and equipment modifications mid-process without delay. Complementing this framework, “Smart Sound Plymouth”[24], an approved test area spanning approximately 1,000 square kilometres, serves as a dedicated testing ground. Furthermore, efforts are underway to supplement safety evidence using digital twins for scenarios where physical testing carries unacceptable risk.

(2) Alleviating the Documentation Burden: Hands-On Expert Support

  To address challenges in documentation, the NCMA provides hands-on, close-proximity support, with experts from universities and PML working closely alongside company teams throughout the process. They offer direct, hands-on assistance, helping to clarify the intent behind regulatory enquiries and determine how best to formulate responses and translate them into submission documents, substantially reducing the time and financial burden on companies and enabling more agile technological development.

◆ Conclusion

  Through booth visits and seminars at OI 2026, this report has compiled information on initiatives surrounding USV development and deployment. It appears that USV are at an inflection point toward integration with existing legal frameworks and broader social deployment. Japan faces similar challenges, including insufficient development environments such as demonstration facilities and field sites, and the need to establish appropriate regulatory frameworks for unmanned marine vehicles. Industry-academia-government collaboration is widely regarded as a cornerstone in addressing these challenges. The UK initiatives examined in this report offer instructive models for Japan as it seeks to bring new technologies to market more quickly. These include phased testing and certification frameworks, dedicated test environments, and sustained hands-on support through public-private-academic partnerships.

  The next Oceanology International is scheduled to take place at Excel London from 14 to 16 March 2028.

 (Yoshihiro Kawakami, Researcher, London Office, The Japan Association of Marine Safety)

【Reference】

[1]  https://www.oceanologyinternational.com/london/en-gb/blog/press-releases/oceanology-international-2026-wrap-up.html

[2] https://www.excel.london/

[3]  https://rxglobal.com/rx-uk

[4]  https://blue-economy-observatory.ec.europa.eu/events/oceanology-international-2026-global-nexus-ocean-technology-2026-03-10_en

[5]  https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/technology/usv/

[6]  https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/kaiyo_wg/2kai/pdf/shiryo2.pdf

[7]  https://www.ocean.tech/

[8]  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-workboat-code-edition-3

[9]  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/maritime-and-coastguard-agency

[10]  https://www.lr.org/en/knowledge/press-room/press-listing/press-release/2025/uks-first-rouv-certified-under-workboat-code-3-as-lloyds-register-awards-compliance-to-acua-oceans-pioneer/

[11]  https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgzm0xr909o

[12]  https://oceaninfinity.com/

[13]  https://xocean.com/

[14]  https://starlink.com/

[15]  https://www.maritimerobotics.com/

[16]  https://www.oceanologyinternational.com/london/en-gb/programme/session-details.4738.255927.panel-exploring-the-future-potential-of-in_water-test-facilities-for-dual_use.html

[17]  https://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/pages/colreg.aspx

[18]  https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/ja/news.aspx?id=14402&layout=1&type=p

[19]  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence

[20]  https://www.marineautonomy.org.uk/

[21]  https://pml.ac.uk/news/plymouth-is-to-be-the-national-centre-for-marine-autonomy/

[22]  https://www.plymouth.ac.uk/research/marine-autonomy

[23]  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/projects-selected-for-the-regulators-pioneer-fund/projects-selected-for-the-regulators-pioneer-fund-2022

[24]  https://smartsoundplymouth.co.uk/

◆ はじめに

　2026年3月10～12日に、英国・ロンドンのExcel London[1]で開催された「Oceanology International 2026（OI 2026）[2]」に参加してまいりました。RX社[3]が主催する本展示会について、欧州委員会（EU）[4]は、海洋に関する科学、技術、エンジニアリングにおいて世界を牽引する国際フォーラムと説明しています。

　本イベントの公式HPによると、開催期間の3日間で、30カ国以上から461社が出展し、総来場者数は15,709名でした。会場では、海洋に関する科学や技術・エンジニアリング等の海洋分野の製品が多数展示され、併設のドックサイドでは船やUSVなど実際の製品のデモンストレーションも実施されました。また、カンファレンスゾーンとしてCoast Theatreなどが設けられ、セミナーやパネルディスカッションなど、合計203名が登壇しました。

　今回の視察では、無人水上船舶[5]（USV：Uncrewed Surface Vessels）製品の出展が多くみられました。USVとは、船上に乗組員を有さない水上船舶のことです[6]。日本でも、開発環境の未整備（実証施設・フィールド）、海洋無人機に関する制度の在り方[7]は課題として指摘されています。

　本報告では、会場のブースおよびセミナーで確認した内容を基に、欧州やイギリスの事例を紹介させていただきます。なお、本レポートは、あくまで調査視察の事例として紹介するものであり、特定企業の推薦を意図するものではございません。

◆USVの特徴的な出展企業

（１）ACUA Ocean[8]

　英国・プリマスを拠点とするスタートアップ企業。水素燃料電池を搭載したUSVとして、他社に先駆けて英国海事沿岸警備庁（MCA: Maritime and Coastguard Agency）[9]が認可する「小型作業船および水先船の安全に関する実施基準 (The Workboat Code Edition 3）[10]」の付属書の2（Annex 2）の認証を取得した実績[11]を持っています。また、主力のUSV「Pioneer」は水素を燃料としており、24時間、ゼロエミッションでの運用を達成しています。[12]

（２）Ocean Infinity[13]

　英国・サウサンプトンに拠点を持ち、業界を牽引する海洋テクノロジー企業です。これまで大型の有人船が行っていた複雑な作業を無人船で代替することを目指しています。主な特徴は、完全な自律航行に頼るのではなく、陸上にある遠隔操作センター（ROC：Remote Operation Centre）から人間が監視・制御する「遠隔操作」を運用の中核に据えている点にあります。

（３）XOCEAN[14]　

　アイルランドを拠点とする企業。ハイブリッド電源（ソーラーパネル、バッテリー、小型発電機）を搭載したUSVを運用しています。Starlink[15]などの高速インターネットや全地球測位衛星システム（GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System）等を使用し、陸上の遠隔操作センターから、日本を含む世界中の自社USVをリモート制御している点が特徴です。

（４）Maritime Robotics[16]

　ノルウェーを拠点とする企業。環境に優しい小型船や、長期間稼働できるUSVなど、様々な用途に合わせた船を提供しています。 日本の企業にも販売実績があり、主に浅瀬や港の地形を調べる調査に活用されています。この企業の主な特徴は、USVのみを販売するだけでなく、無人化を促進するための船の頭脳となるシステムのみの販売もしている点です。

◆ USVの普及に向けた制度的な課題

　会場で行われたパネルセッション「デュアルユース向け水中・水上テスト施設の可能性[17]」では、USV普及を阻む「テストと認証の壁」について、事業者と規制当局の双方から現場における制度的な課題に関して率直な意見交換が行われました。なお、イギリスでは、MCAが既存の法律や規則の解釈運用を通じて革新的な技術に対応しています。それだけでは十分にカバーできない部分については、MGN664等のガイダンスを適用し、必要に応じて既存規則の適用除外を付与しています。こうした認証や適用除外を取得するには、申請者がリスク評価や安全性の根拠を示し、MCAの承認を得る必要があります。

（１）法制度：テストと認証の「堂々巡り」の矛盾

　事業者として登壇したACUA Ocean社は、現在の安全認証プロセスがスタートアップ企業にとってコストと労力の面で「非常に大きな（Brutal）負担」であると指摘しました。これに対し、規制当局であるMCAのSam Hodder氏も、「運用側はテストの実績を得るために許可を求め、規制側はテストを許可するために事前の安全証明を求める」という構造的な矛盾が生じていることを認めています。さらに、混雑した海域で衝突回避ルール（COLREGs）[18]への対応力を証明するには、実際の海での物理的なテストだけでは不十分かつ危険が伴います。そのため仮想空間上で船体や現実の物理現象を高精度に再現する「デジタルツイン（シミュレーション）[19]」を用いた安全性のエビデンスが必要であるとの認識が示されました。

（２）書類作成：柔軟かつ迅速な技術開発の阻害

　ACUA Ocean社はまた、スタートアップ企業が規制当局の求める複雑な安全基準やリスク評価に関する書類を自力で作成することは困難だったと述べました。さらに、船の仕様を少し変更するだけでも書類のやり直し（再認証）が求められる現状のプロセスは、「早く失敗して早く改善する」という柔軟かつ迅速な技術開発を阻害する要因になっていると指摘されました。

◆上記課題に対する英国の取組事例（国立海洋自律センター / NCMA）

　上記２つの課題の解決に向けて、英国では、国家レベルの取組が進められています。具体的には、英国国防省（Ministry of Defence）[20]はプリマス地域を「国立海洋自律センター（NCMA: National Centre for Marine Autonomy）[21]」に指定し、産学官の連携を通じて以下のような解決策を提講じています。

（１）法制度の矛盾に対する解決策：段階的テストのフレームワークとテスト環境の提供

 　テストと認証の「堂々巡り」を解消するため、NCMAの主要パートナーであるプリマス海洋研究所（PML：Plymouth Marine Laboratory）[22]やプリマス大学[23]は、MCAと共同で「海事規制イノベーションフレームワーク(MRIF：Maritime Regulatory Innovation Framework )[24]」を開発しています。これは、最初から船体への完全な安全認証を求めるのではなく、警戒船の配置や緊急停止手順など、「運用上のリスク軽減策（初期の安全ケース）」を構築することで、沖合でのテストを段階的に許可する仕組みです。これにより、プロトタイプ船の仕様や搭載機器を途中で変更しても迅速に対応できるようになります。 加えて、テストの場として、約1,000平方キロメートルに及ぶ認可されたテスト海域「Smart Sound Plymouth[25]」を提供しています。また、物理的なテストが危険なシナリオについては、デジタルツイン（シミュレーション）を活用して安全性のエビデンスを補完する取り組みも進められています。

（２）書類作成の負担に対する解決策：専門機関による「伴走支援」

 書類作成における課題に対して、NCMAでは大学やPMLの専門家が企業に寄り添う形で、伴走支援を行っています。例えば、「当局の質問の意図は何か」「どのように回答して書類に落とし込むのがベストか」などを一緒に確認しながら直接的にサポートしています。この支援により、企業の時間的・金銭的負担が大幅に軽減され、アジャイルな技術開発が支援されています。

◆ おわりに

　OI 2026でのブース訪問やセミナーを通して、USVに関する取組の情報収集を行いました。全体を通して、USVは既存の法制度への適合や社会システムへの実装フェーズへの移行段階にあることを感じることができました。冒頭で述べたとおり、日本においても、実証施設・フィールドなどの開発環境の未整備や、海洋無人機に関する制度の在り方が課題として認識されています。こうした課題に対応するうえで、産学官の連携は重要な要素であると考えられます。テストや認証の枠組みを現場の実情に合わせて構築する・テスト環境を提供する・産学官連携で伴走支援する。こういった取組は新技術の市場投入を加速させるうえで、日本においても参考になる事例といえます。

 次回Oceanology Internationalは、2年後の2028年3月14～16日にExcel Londonで開催されます。

（公益社団法人　日本海難防止協会　ロンドン事務所　研究員　川上慶大）

【参考資料】

[1] https://www.excel.london/

[2] https://www.oceanologyinternational.com/london/en-gb/blog/press-releases/oceanology-international-2026-wrap-up.html

[3] https://rxglobal.com/rx-uk

[4] https://blue-economy-observatory.ec.europa.eu/events/oceanology-international-2026-global-nexus-ocean-technology-2026-03-10_en

[5] https://www.nikkaibo.or.jp/london_pdf/2025-07_oushu%20anzen%20report_Jpn.pdf

[6] https://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/technology/usv/

[7] https://www8.cao.go.jp/ocean/policies/kaiyo_wg/2kai/pdf/shiryo2.pdf

[8] https://www.ocean.tech/

[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/maritime-and-coastguard-agency

[10] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-workboat-code-edition-3

[11] https://www.lr.org/en/knowledge/press-room/press-listing/press-release/2025/uks-first-rouv-certified-under-workboat-code-3-as-lloyds-register-awards-compliance-to-acua-oceans-pioneer/

[12] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgzm0xr909o

[13] https://oceaninfinity.com/

[14] https://xocean.com/

[15] https://starlink.com/

[16] https://www.maritimerobotics.com/

[17] https://www.oceanologyinternational.com/london/en-gb/programme/session-details.4738.255927.panel-exploring-the-future-potential-of-in_water-test-facilities-for-dual_use.html

[18] https://www.imo.org/en/about/conventions/pages/colreg.aspx

[19] https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/ja/news.aspx?id=14402&layout=1&type=p

[20] https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence

[21] https://www.marineautonomy.org.uk/

[22] https://pml.ac.uk/news/plymouth-is-to-be-the-national-centre-for-marine-autonomy/

[23] https://www.plymouth.ac.uk/research/marine-autonomy

[24] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/projects-selected-for-the-regulators-pioneer-fund/projects-selected-for-the-regulators-pioneer-fund-2022

[25] https://smartsoundplymouth.co.uk/

New offshore infrastructure increasingly anticipates the risk of hybrid threats as reported in an article by Euractiv^[1] on offshore wind farms in Poland.

The article reports that a new wind farm that is being built off the Polish coast in the Baltic Sea will not only produce electricity, but also play a crucial role when it comes to anticipating and deterring potential hybrid attacks. According to the article, “The 120-metre towers are set to become sentinels, tirelessly scanning the brackish waters and leaden skies for hostile activity”. Baltic Power, the wind farm operator, will equip the new wind turbine towers with radars and sensors according to instructions from Poland’s defence ministry.

Also in Belgium, wind farm developers have to commit to be ready to share data with the military and also host military hardware, if needed. Wind turbines have a long history of monitoring their surroundings, originally for the purpose of protecting birds. But with increasing geopolitical tensions, this capacity can now also be used for other purposes.

In the meantime, investigations into past hybrid attacks are advancing. According to media reports, for example by the Guardian^[2], Finnish authorities have filed charges against the captain as well as the first and second officers of Eagle2, an oil tanker that is supposedly part of the Russian shadow fleet and which is suspected of having on purpose damaged undersea cables between Finland and Estonia with its anchor in December 2024.

The ship registered in the Cook Islands was carrying oil from the Russian port of Ust-Luga across the Gulf of Finland when it dragged its anchor along the seabed for about 90 km, creating damage to high-capacity electricity transmission and telecommunications cables. After a detention period of a few months, the vessel has in the meantime been allowed to leave Finland, but the three suspects now indicted have to appear for hearings in front of a Helsinki district court. Finland’s deputy prosecutor general has filed charges of aggravated sabotage and interference with communications. 

[1] See Euractiv: Europe’s wind farm army, 11 August 2025, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence/news/europes-wind-farm-army/

[2] See The Guardian: Finland charges tanker crew members with sabotage of undersea cables, 11 August 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/11/finland-accuses-tanker-crew-sabotage-undersea-cables-anchor

On 31 July, the European Commission launched a call for evidence^[1] to gather input on plans to update EU rules governing the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex^[2]). The initiative aims to strengthen the EU’s ability to protect its external borders, respond to evolving security challenges, and ensure the effective implementation of integrated border management across Member States.

Frontex, operating since 1 May 2005 and currently governed by Regulation (EU) 2019/1896^[3], plays a central role in supporting Member States with border management, return operations, and security at the EU’s external frontiers. An evaluation carried out by the European Commission in 2023 highlighted legal and operational gaps that limit the agency’s effectiveness. These include unclear mandates in certain tasks, limited capacity in return operations, inconsistent training standards, and governance structures that may no longer match Frontex’s expanded role. While the current Regulation does not include any obligation for the Commission to propose a revision – there is only an obligation for regular evaluations – the last evaluation report triggered the European Commission to launch a review process.

The proposed revision of rules governing Frontex hopes to address these gaps, prepare the agency for an enlarged standing corps of border guards, and enhance its technological capabilities. The reforms aim to improve cooperation with third countries, counter cross-border crime, harmonise training, and strengthen governance and oversight while upholding fundamental rights.

The Commission is inviting contributions from Member States, EU institutions, civil society, international organisations, industry, academia, and the general public. The online public consultation will run until 11 September. The contributions will feed into an impact assessment, supported by an external study due in early 2026, which will underpin the Commission’s legislative proposal to revise Frontex’s rules expected in Q3 2026.

The process is expected to be similar than the review of the EMSA Regulation which has recently be concluded, with the only difference that the Frontex proposal might be more politically controversial since it also includes aspects related to controversial topics like border protection and immigration.

[1] https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14640-European-Border-and-Coast-Guard-update-of-EU-rules_en

[2] https://www.frontex.europa.eu/

[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/1896/oj/eng

The European Commission has tabled a delegated Regulation^[1] and its annex^[2], introducing the exact criteria and methodology to define low-carbon hydrogen and fuels, including for maritime applications. This is a technical legislative act that further specifies certain provisions of  Directive (EU) 2024/1788^[3] on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen.

In an explanatory press release^[4], the European Commission recalls that low-carbon fuels “will support efforts to decarbonise sectors where electrification is currently not a viable option, such as aviation, shipping and certain industrial processes.” The Commission press release also refers back to the overarching rule, set by the above-mentioned Directive on renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen from which the delegated Regulation derives: “To be considered low carbon, hydrogen and related fuels will need to reach a threshold of 70% greenhouse gas emission savings compared to the use of unabated fossil fuels. This means that low-carbon hydrogen can be produced in various ways, for instance using natural gas with carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS) – a technology that prevents emissions from the process of producing hydrogen-, as well as from low-carbon electricity sources”, the European Commission writes.

The purpose of the delegated Regulation and the annex is to define how exactly a fuel can meet the low-carbon criteria. The delegated Regulation does this among others by setting different default values, depending whether hydrogen is produced from natural pipeline gas, LNG or other fossil fuels.

The delegated Regulation complements a delegated Regulation^[5] on renewable hydrogen and is thus considered to be an important addition to the EU’s rulebook on hydrogen, a fuel expected to contribute to the decarbonisation of hard-to abate sectors, in particular  shipping and aviation.  This regulatory development is not directly linked to the EU’s work at IMO level, but there is still a connection, since a comprehensive regulatory environment for the production of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen and its derivatives are also expected to contribute to the decarbonisation of international shipping.           

The delegated Regulation will formally enter into force at the latest on 10 November 2025, provided there is no veto by the European Parliament or the Council of the EU (EU Member States). However, such a veto is a very unlikely scenario.

It can be understood as being another important piece in the EU’s regulatory framework governing low-carbon hydrogen and fuels.

[1] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3d3d0214-75f4-4e79-805e-3240526e2082_en?filename=C_2025_4674_1_EN_ACT_part1_v8.pdf

[2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/document/download/7d6e84e5-a188-4573-b0f6-2d069fd04e85_en?filename=C_2025_4674_1_EN_annexe_acte_autonome_part1_v7.pdf

[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1788/oj/eng

[4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1743

[5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2023.157.01.0011.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2023%3A157%3ATOC

Ammonia is one of the alternative fuels currently considered to help with meeting GHG emissions requirements for maritime transport. Consequently, it is expected to provide a contribution to meeting GHG emission reduction targets both at EU and at IMO level. As an advisory body to both the European Commission and EU Member States, the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has now released parts 3, 4, and 5 of its study series on the safety of ammonia as a marine fuel. Launched in 2023, the series assesses risks and mitigation measures for ammonia-fuelled vessels. The whole series can be accessed here^[1]. Parts 1 and 2 were published in 2024. Below is an overview of the recent publications. While the publications are independent from the discussions and developments made at the IMO, there is still a link as ammonia is considered as one possible solution to meet decarbonisation targets agreed at the IMO.

Part 3: Risk Assessment of a Generic Ship Design

This report presents a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study of a generic Ammonia Fuel Supply System (AFSS), a risk assessment from ports’ perspectives including simultaneous operations (SIMOPS), and consequence modelling of potential leaks. It stresses the need to fully understand ammonia’s unique characteristics to develop effective safety measures.

Part 4: Risk Assessment of a Bulk Carrier Ship Design (Newcastlemax Dry Bulk Carrier)

Using a hazard identification (HAZID) approach, the study finds that ammonia bunkering during simultaneous operations (SIMOPS), especially alongside cargo operations, should be restricted or phased in gradually, especially during the early adoption phase of ammonia-fuelled vessels. Chemical compatibility between ammonia and cargo environments needs further evaluation due to potential interference with safety systems. Ship layouts and emergency preparedness must be adapted to ammonia-specific risks. The report highlights the main hazardous SIMOPS and proposes recommendations and mitigation measures including personnel training, enhanced emergency coordination, and infrastructure improvements such as larger fuel tanks to reduce bunkering frequency.

Part 5: Risk Assessment of a RORO Ship Design (Mega RoRo)

This hazard identification (HAZID) study covers design considerations, consequence modelling, and a probit analysis for toxic exposure scenarios. It highlights ammonia’s toxicity, corrosivity, and flammability, calling for double barriers, short piping runs, robust detection, and redundant ventilation systems. Emergency plans should include safe havens, mustering zones, and clear escape routes. The probit analysis showed low fatality risk (<1% beyond 1 km) for a short leak, but high risk (>70% within 250 m) for a major tank rupture, underlining the role of exposure duration in hazard zone planning.

EMSA has opened a consultation as part of its ongoing series, inviting stakeholders to participate in a survey related to the study’s recommendations. The consultation places the study recommendations within the framework of the existing IMO Interim Guidelines for the safety of ships using ammonia as fuel (MSC.1/Circ.1687). The consultation can be found here^[2] and is open for feedback until 19 September.

[1] https://emsa.europa.eu/publications/reports/item/5264-study-investigating-the-safety-of-ammonia-as-fuel-on-ships.html

[2] https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/EMSAAmmoniaSafetyStudy

INTRODUCTION

The first two articles of this news report mainly deal with the topic of GHG reduction and alternative fuels, while the second and third article provide updates on developments related to maritime security and hybrid threats.
The first article in this report, which falls in the categories of “maritime GHG reduction” and “safety”, relates to recent publications by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) on its ongoing study
assessing the safety of ammonia as a marine fuel. The article outlines the three recent publications under this study and also points to an ongoing consultation on the study’s recommendations.
The second article is also related to decarbonisation and presents rules recently adopted by the European Commission on the definition of low-carbon hydrogen.
The third article reports about a call for evidence launched by the European Commission which will support the Commission’s legislative proposal to revise the rules governing the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex). The proposal for a revision is expected in Q3 2026.
The fourth article describes how new offshore infrastructure, in particular wind farms, anticipate and mitigate the risk of hybrid threats. It also provides an update of the investigation into a hybrid attack on cable infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

[Click the link below to read the article]

• EMSA publishes additional reports on the safety of ammonia
• European Commission adopts criteria defining low-carbon hydrogen
• European Commission takes steps to revise rules governing Frontex
• Offshore infrastructure to help address hybrid threats

A Council Decision^[1] that extends the mandate of EUNAVFOR Operation ASPIDES^[2] until 27 February 2027, was published in the EU’s Official Journal. ASPIDES is the EU’s maritime security mission that was launched in February 2024 to protect ships under attack in the Red Sea and to reinforce maritime situational awareness.

Against the background of the escalation in the Middle East, there are reportedly informal discussions to adapt the mandate of the mission more substantially or to start a new mission, but these discussions have not yet reached a formal stage yet. The French President Emmanuel Macron on a recent visit to Cyprus in an official speech^[3] floated the idea of an “ad-hoc mission” to “restore the freedom of navigation” in the Strait of Hormuz when the “right moment” is there. According to President Macron, the mission should have a purely defensive mandate, but his choice of words seems to indicate that the mission will not be launched as long as the open conflict between Israel and US on the one and Iran and its proxies on the other hand is still ongoing.

[1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L_202600439

[2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-aspides_en?s=410381

[3] https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-26087-fr.pdf

Germany and Belgium are implementing stringent military and legislative measures to protect critical infrastructure from the escalating threat of unauthorized drones.

In Germany, the public broadcaster ARD reports^[1] that  the national Parliament has passed an updated law^[2] on aerial protection (Luftsicherheitsgesetz)to defend airports from drones, which officials warn pose a “hybrid threat” of sabotage and espionage. Even a single drone can paralyze an airport, forcing flight diversions and disrupting international supply chains. To combat this, the new law simplifies the deployment of the armed forces (Bundeswehr), allowing the Defense Ministry to authorize military assistance without prior coordination with the Interior Ministry. In extreme emergencies, soldiers are now permitted to shoot down drones to prevent severe accidents. Furthermore, the law imposes stricter penalties, including up to five years in prison for individuals—such as climate activists—who intentionally breach airport security zones and endanger civil aviation.

Meanwhile, Belgium, is, according to news reports^[3], fortifying the Port of Antwerp, a crucial logistical hub that houses a major kerosene pipeline to Marseille and facilitates American military supplies. Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever announced that the port will be shielded by the Norwegian NASAMS air defense system starting in 2027. While this system can effectively neutralize large unmanned aerial vehicles like Shahed drones, smaller drones navigating low between buildings remain difficult to detect. To address this vulnerability, the Belgian Defense Ministry is actively investing in specialized “anti-drone drones”. These upgrades directly address the growing fears of port businesses, who reported sightings of unidentified drones over sensitive chemical plants last winter. Ultimately, Belgium plans to link these systems with the Netherlands to create a protective defense dome over the entire Benelux region.

The developments in Germany and Belgium show that EU countries see an increased need for building up and coordinating their defence and resilience against aerial threats from drones, in particular against the background of hybrid threats from Russia.

[1] https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/bundestag-beratung-luftsicherheitsgesetz-100.html

[2] https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/21/032/2103252.pdf

[3] https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/nl/2026/02/26/luchtafweergeschut-haven-antwerpen-bart-de-wever-2027/